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DEFINING THE INTERFACE OF FREEDOM AND 
DISCRIMINATION: EXERCISING RELIGION, 
DEMOCRACY AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
 
ALEX DEAGON* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Free Exercise of Religion – Priority for Democracy – Freedom – 
Discrimination – Same-Sex Marriage 
 
A number of recent cases in Australia have highlighted an emerging 
tension between religious freedom and anti-discrimination law, 
particularly in relation to sexual orientation and same-sex 
marriage. Opponents of same-sex marriage assert that if same-sex 
marriage is legalised, anti-discrimination law could be used to 
restrict religious exercise which conflicts with same-sex marriage. 
Any constitutional protection of religious exercise is questionable 
due to the historically narrow construction of the free exercise 
clause by the High Court. Consequently, this article defines the 
boundaries of the free exercise clause in this dynamic context, 
arguing that the High Court should adopt a broader interpretation 
of free exercise informed by the same priority for democracy 
reasoning which undergirds the implied freedom of political 
communication. Contextually appropriate and clear boundaries for 
the free exercise clause are required for law to effectively engage 
with this continuing tension between religious freedom and anti-
discrimination in a same-sex marriage context. 
 
  
 
I AUSTRALIA IN THE CRUCIBLE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM VERSUS ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION 
 
The starting point for this article is the fundamental legal tension in 
Australia between free exercise of religion and anti-discrimination 
law, and in particular laws dealing with sexual orientation. For 
example, in Christian Youth Camps Limited v Cobaw Community 
Health Services Limited,1 Cobaw, an organisation providing suicide 
awareness and prevention support to young people experiencing 
same-sex attraction, sought to make a booking for a campsite that 
was generally available to community groups. Christian Youth 
Camps (CYC), a camping organisation connected to the Christian 
Brethren, refused to make the campsite available on the basis that it 
did not want to participate in the advocacy of homosexual activity. 
Dismissing an appeal, the Victorian Supreme Court found that CYC 
had discriminated against Cobaw because of sexual orientation.  
 
Conversely, in Bunning v Centacare,2 an employee of a Catholic 
family counselling centre was dismissed because of her involvement 
in polyamorous activities. She claimed discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation, but the Federal Court decided that polyamory 
is a behaviour rather than an orientation, so there was no 
discrimination. Recently, Tasmania’s Archbishop of the Catholic 
Church released a statement affirming traditional marriage. 
Transgender activist and Federal Greens candidate, Martine 
Delaney, impugned this document on the basis that it breached 
Tasmania’s anti-discrimination law by insulting, offending or 
humiliating an individual or group because of a listed attribute 
(homosexuality), and brought a case to the Tasmanian Anti-
Discrimination Commission. Though the case was eventually 
dropped, Delaney argued that ‘some freedoms are not absolute’, and 
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1  [2014] VSCA 75. 
2  [2015] FCCA 280. 
  
 
‘in a secular society religious freedom must sometimes give way to 
the law’.3 
 
It is likely that these sorts of cases will continue to increase in 
frequency and complexity, particularly if same-sex marriage is 
legalised. Opponents of same-sex marriage argue it will undermine 
free exercise of religion by combining with anti-discrimination 
legislation to restrict free exercise and expression of religious 
perspectives and practices which may conflict with same-sex 
marriage. They claim such legislation may be used to ‘enforce a 
new dimension of political correctness’, instituting a ‘new right’ 
which would ‘trump previously held rights’ such as the right of 
religious ministers and institutions to be able to refuse to solemnise 
a same-sex marriage on the ground of their religious beliefs.4  
 
Though proponents of same-sex marriage have responded by saying 
that exemptions will be passed to cover these circumstances, the fear 
is that either the promise for such exemptions is disingenuous, or 
that in practice the exemptions will not effectively operate to protect 
religious people, ministers or organisations from claims of 
discrimination.5 This fear has been exacerbated by major political 
parties indicating that they may reduce or remove the anti-
discrimination exemptions which already exist for religious 
organisations if they are elected, or the Shadow Attorney-General 
indicating that he does not believe there is any relation between 
same-sex marriage and encroachment on religious freedom.6 
                                                            
3  ABC News, Anti-discrimination complaint ‘an attempt to silence’ the 
Church over same-sex marriage, Hobart Archbishop says (28 
September 2015)  
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-28/anti-discrimination-
complaint-an-attempt-to-silence-the-church/6810276>.  
4  Neville Rochow, ‘Speak Now or Forever Hold Your Peace – The 
Influence of Constitutional Argument on Same-Sex Marriage 
Legislation Debates in Australia’ (2013) 2013(3) Brigham Young 
University Law Review 521, 526–27. 
5  Ibid 526. 
6 See, e.g., Sen Penny Wright, Caring About the Rule of Law: 
Protecting Human Rights (25 July 2015) Australian Greens 
 
  
 
Moreover, any protection given by s 116 of the Constitution, which 
contains a clause prohibiting laws which restrict the free exercise of 
religion, is questionable due to its very narrow construction by the 
High Court.7 
 
The clause which prohibits laws restricting the free exercise of 
religion applies solely to Commonwealth laws and has only been 
tested three times, with the High Court yet to find a violation.8 This 
dearth of judicial activity concerning the free exercise clause, and 
lack of use where it is relevant, belies its potential and developing 
importance in the arena of religious freedom and anti-
discrimination, where anti-discrimination legislation may effectively 
operate to curb the free exercise of religion. Consequently, this 
article will attempt to define the boundaries of the free exercise 
clause in this dynamic legal context of same-sex marriage and anti-
discrimination law relating to orientation and marital status (as a 
new definition of marriage would presumably influence the 
                                                                                                                 
<http://greensmps.org.au/sites/default/files/130725_greens_rol.pdf>; 
See also Could a Deal on the Gay Marriage Plebiscite be on the 
Cards? (24 September 2016) News.com.au 
<http://www.news.com.au/lifestyle/gay-marriage/could-a-deal-on-
the-gay-marriage-plebiscite-be-on-the-cards/news-
story/e09eafc5fbd2c4b729b347743976162f>. 
7  Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1; Rochow, above n 4, 
528.  
8  See most recently Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 40 
(Brennan CJ), 161 (Gummow J) where laws forcibly removing 
Indigenous Australians from their culture and heritage did not breach 
the free exercise clause. For the previous two cases see Krygger v 
Williams (1912) 15 CLR 366 where religiously grounded objections 
to compulsory military participation were not considered within the 
scope of free exercise of religion, and Adelaide Company of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116 where 
legislation dissolving the Jehovah’s Witnesses organisation did not 
breach the free exercise clause. See generally David Bogen, ‘The 
Religion Clauses and Freedom of Speech in Australia and the United 
States: Incidental Restrictions and Generally Applicable Laws’ 
(1998) 46 Drake Law Review 53, 57–8. No case has considered the 
free exercise clause since Bogen’s article. 
  
 
interpretation of the marital status provisions). The analysis will 
focus primarily on Australian law in the Commonwealth 
jurisdiction. 
 
The central argument of this article is that the free exercise clause 
should be expanded to protect religious freedom from the general 
operation of anti-discrimination law in particular circumstances. 
There are two components to this argument. The first component is 
the claim that the interpretation of the free exercise clause should be 
expanded. Within this claim, there are two issues considered. First, 
one problem with the current law on free exercise is the ‘purpose’ 
requirement. To be a law invalidly restricting the free exercise of 
religion, the law must have the restriction or regulation of religion 
as part of its express purpose.9 This means that the Commonwealth 
can potentially restrict the free exercise of religion indirectly 
through the effect of the law, circumventing and undermining the 
application of the free exercise clause. In Part II, the article argues 
that in contrast to the current majority view which requires that the 
law restrict free exercise of religion in its terms, the High Court 
ought to adopt Gaudron J’s more expansive view that the free 
exercise clause operates to prohibit laws which restrict free exercise 
of religion by their indirect effect, as well as by their direct 
purpose.10 
 
The second issue with the current law on the free exercise clause is 
the paucity of decisions and the strict method of resolving these 
decisions. This may be related to a general lack of scholarly 
consideration of the relationship between the free exercise clause 
and anti-discrimination legislation.11 The free exercise clause has 
                                                            
9  Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 40 (Brennan CJ), 161 
(Gummow J). 
10  Ibid 131–32. 
11  Instead, articles have largely focused on a human rights clash 
between the right to freely exercise religion and the right to freedom 
from discrimination: See, e.g. Anthony Gray, ‘Reconciliation of 
Freedom of Religion With Anti-Discrimination Rights’ (2016) 42(1) 
Monash University Law Review 72. 
  
 
been interpreted narrowly, and this could present problems for the 
protection of religious freedom in the context of anti-discrimination. 
However, the true nature and extent of any potential problem is not 
really known because the justification, nature and limits of the free 
exercise clause are largely unclear and unarticulated in the modern 
context of tension with anti-discrimination legislation. To address 
this, the article develops Gaudron J’s view in Part III and applies it 
in Parts V and VI. According to contextual constitutional structure 
and principled argument, a broad view of free exercise is informed 
by reasoning similar to that underlying the implied freedom of 
political communication; namely, that democracy should be 
prioritised through limiting restrictions (such as anti-discrimination 
legislation) on the public expression of religious views and practice. 
This further means that we may borrow from the implied freedom’s 
methodology to articulate the limits of the freedom; this is discussed 
in Parts VI and VII. 
 
The second component of the central argument is the claim that 
religious freedom should be protected from the general operation of 
anti-discrimination law in particular circumstances. The main issue 
here involves balancing free exercise of religion with anti-
discrimination and complements the first component of the central 
argument by contemplating a different kind of expansion to the free 
exercise clause. The current religious exemptions in Commonwealth 
anti-discrimination law relating to sexual orientation and marital 
status, outlined in Part IV, are restricted to religious organisations 
and do not extend to religious individuals. However, the text of the 
free exercise clause does not distinguish between free exercise of 
religion for organisations and free exercise of religion for 
individuals. It simply states that free exercise of religion should not 
be prohibited, and an implication is that this applies to both 
individuals and organisations. Therefore, the article argues in Parts 
V and VI that the discrimination exemptions for religious 
organisations which already exist should be preserved, and could 
also be extended to protect religious individuals who engage in 
religious practice at risk of restriction by anti-discrimination 
legislation. 
 
  
 
Part VI consequently articulates an approach to the boundaries of 
free exercise informed by these textual and contextual 
considerations and develops a preliminary test which is more 
expansive and more appropriate for defining the interface between 
freedom and discrimination.12 Finally, Part VII summarises the 
argument and explains the test, indicating the importance of clear 
and specific boundaries for the operation of the free exercise clause 
in preparation for a future where there will most likely be sustained 
conflict between religious freedom and anti-discrimination. 
 
II FREE EXERCISE: BROADENING A NARROW APPROACH 
 
The first task of this article is to explain the current High Court 
doctrine regarding the free exercise clause contained in s 116 and 
consider the possibility of adopting the broad approach advocated 
by Gaudron J. Section 116 of the Australian Constitution states that: 
The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing 
any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for 
prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious 
test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public 
trust under the Commonwealth.13 
 
Evans explains that s 116 has historically been given a very 
conservative and limited interpretation by the High Court, such that 
the boundaries of free exercise and issues of discrimination have 
largely been left to political and democratic processes. Courts have 
been generous and inclusive in defining religion, but very narrow in 
                                                            
12  Moens calls for such a test: see Gabriel Moens, ‘Action-Belief 
Dichotomy and Freedom of Religion’ (1989) 12 Sydney Law Review 
195, 215. 
13  For an overview and consideration of the legal and historical context 
of s 116, see generally Anthony Blackshield, ‘Religion and Australian 
Constitutional Law’ in P Radan et al (eds), Law and Religion 
(Routledge, 2005). For an overview of the legal state of the free 
exercise clause see Gabriel Moens et al, The Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Australia Annotated (LexisNexis, 8th ed, 2011) 
799–804. 
  
 
defining the scope of religious freedom.14 Chief Justice Latham in 
Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth 
(‘Jehovah’s Witnesses’)15 argued that since the ‘free exercise’ of 
religion is protected, this includes but extends beyond religious 
belief or the mere holding of religious opinion; the protection ‘from 
the operation of any Commonwealth laws’ covers ‘acts which are 
done in the exercise of religion’ or ‘acts done in pursuance of 
religious belief as part of religion’.16 However, subsequent cases 
noted these acts must be religious conduct, or ‘conduct in which a 
person engages in giving effect to his [sic] faith in the 
supernatural’.17 Religious conduct protected by s 116 extends to 
‘faith and worship, to the teaching and propagation of religion, and 
                                                            
14  See in particular Krygger v Williams (1912) 15 CLR 366, 369 
(Griffith CJ); Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc. v 
Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116, 149–150 (Rich J); Church of the 
New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 
120, 135–136 (Mason ACJ and Brennan J). See also Carolyn Evans, 
‘Religion as Politics not law: the Religion Clauses in the Australian 
Constitution’ (2008) 36(3) Religion, State and Society 283, 284. 
Mortenson also observes the very narrow interpretation given to the 
free exercise clause, though he acknowledges that questions over the 
applicability of s 116 to the Territories and the fact that it only applies 
to Commonwealth legislation have also contributed to its restricted 
operation. See Reid Mortenson, ‘The Unfinished Experiment: A 
Report on Religious Freedom in Australia’ (2007) 21 Emory 
International Law Review 167, 170–71. 
15  Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc. v Commonwealth 
(1943) 67 CLR 116. 
16  Ibid 124–25 (Latham CJ). This follows Griffith CJ in the 1912 case 
of Krygger v Williams (1912) 15 CLR 366, 369 (Griffith CJ), 
indicating that s 116 not only protects religious belief/opinion or the 
private holding of faith, but also protects ‘the practice of religion – 
the doing of acts which are done in the practice of religion’. For 
further discussion and questions regarding the current applicability of 
this ‘action-belief dichotomy’, see Gabriel Moens, ‘Action-Belief 
Dichotomy and Freedom of Religion’ (1989) 12 Sydney Law Review 
195. 
17  Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax (Vic) 
(1983) 154 CLR 120, 136 (Mason ACJ and Brennan J). 
  
 
to the practices and observances of religion’.18 This is a narrow 
definition which restricts ‘free exercise’ to that conduct which is 
overtly religious and normally considered private in nature, such as 
prayer and church attendance. 
 
Furthermore, not every interference with religion is a breach of s 
116, but only those which ‘unduly infringe’ upon religious 
freedom.19 At a minimum, the High Court has stated that the 
narrowest limitations on free exercise of religion are appropriate – 
that required for the ‘maintenance of civil government’ or ‘the 
continued existence of the community’.20  
 
The framers were conscious of this in their drafting process, 
acknowledging that the free exercise clause should not extend to 
protect those beliefs which include particular religious rites 
involving murder and human sacrifice.21 So at one end of the 
spectrum free exercise of religion is restricted to overtly religious 
conduct which gives effect to a religious belief (e.g., prayer and 
worship), and at the other end of the spectrum, religious conduct 
which is incompatible with a civil government (e.g., murder and 
human sacrifice) is clearly not protected. However, there is limited 
jurisprudence on conduct which falls somewhere in the middle, such 
as public conduct influenced or affected by religious conscience – 
the running of a business, or a school. It is precisely this area which 
is affected by anti-discrimination legislation, and it is problematic 
that there is no exact statement explaining how the free exercise 
clause may protect this conduct. 
 
                                                            
18  Ibid 135–36 (Mason ACJ and Brennan J). 
19  Evans, above n 14, 297; see generally Adelaide Company of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc. v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116. 
20  Mortenson, above n 14, 173; Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses Inc. v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116, 126, 131 
(Latham CJ), 155 (Starke J). 
21 1898 Australasian Federation Conference Third Session Debates, 
Melbourne, 7 February 1898, 656 (Right Hon Sir E N C Braddon). 
  
 
In this sense, Chief Justice Latham was surely right when he 
observed that when defining a ‘free’ exercise of religion, ‘the word 
“free” is vague and ambiguous’ and must take its meaning ‘from the 
context’ – there is no universally applicable definition.22 However, 
the decisions of the High Court in free exercise cases suggest that 
the Court nevertheless takes a very restrictive approach. For 
example, the last time the High Court considered the free exercise 
clause was the 1997 case of Kruger v Commonwealth (‘Kruger’).23 
In Kruger, the plaintiffs argued that a Northern Territory ordinance 
which authorised the forced removal of Indigenous children from 
their tribal culture and heritage was invalid as a law prohibiting the 
free exercise of religion. Leaving aside the Court’s discussion of 
whether s 116 applies in the territories, the majority held that the 
impugned law did not mention the term ‘religion’ and was not ‘for’ 
the purpose of prohibiting the free exercise of religion in its terms, 
and so the law was upheld. Only laws could breach s 116, not the 
administration of laws.24 Chief Justice Brennan, Gummow and 
McHugh JJ (in separate majority judgments) reinforced the 
traditional narrow approach, stating that to be invalid under s 116 
the impugned law ‘must have the purpose of achieving an object 
which s 116 forbids’, and upholding the law on the basis that ‘no 
conduct of a religious nature was proscribed or sought to be 
regulated in any way’.25  
 
Thus the current High Court approach is narrow and focused on the 
explicit purpose of the legislation: if the impugned law does not 
restrict free exercise of religion as part of its purpose, it will be 
valid.26 In Church of the New Faith, Mason ACJ and Brennan J even 
                                                            
22  Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc. v Commonwealth 
(1943) 67 CLR 116, 126–27 (Latham CJ). 
23  (1997) 190 CLR 1. 
24  Evans, above n 14, 296. 
25  Kruger v the Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 40, 161 (Gummow 
J). 
26  The result is foreseen by Moens: see Gabriel Moens, ‘Church and 
state relations in Australia and the United States: The purpose and 
 
  
 
go so far as to say that ‘general laws to preserve and protect society 
are not defeated by a plea of religious obligation to breach them’.27 
So the current High Court position is that generally applicable laws 
for the maintenance of society cannot be prohibited by the free 
exercise clause unless the laws have the specific objective of 
restricting the free exercise of religion. This position has important 
implications for the relationship between the free exercise clause 
and anti-discrimination legislation. Anti-discrimination laws with 
the general (and commendable) objective of promoting equality in 
society will not breach the free exercise clause, because they are not 
directed towards the regulation of religion. Consequently, there may 
well be situations where there are significant restraints placed on 
religious freedom without a breach of s 116 being found.28 
 
As discussed in Part IV, there are some exemptions for religious 
organisations, but this article argues that generally applicable laws 
(such as anti-discrimination legislation) which incidentally restrict 
free exercise should contain exemptions allowing free exercise of 
religion for individuals as well as organisations. Otherwise, the 
Commonwealth could seek to do indirectly what they cannot do 
directly: restrict the free exercise of religion. In addition, as will be 
argued in Part V, this possibility of indirect restriction indicates the 
need for a broader approach which considers effect as well as 
                                                                                                                 
effect approaches and the neutrality principle’ (1996) 4 Brigham 
Young University Law Review, 788–89, 809–810. 
27 Evans, above n 14, 297; Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of 
Pay-Roll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120, 136 (Mason ACJ and 
Brennan J). 
28  For example, in Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v 
Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116, 132–33 (Latham CJ), the Court 
held that the regulations purporting to dissolve the organisation did 
not infringe s 116. Cf S McLeish, ‘Making Sense of Religion and the 
Constitution: A Fresh Start for Section 116’ (1992) 18 Monash 
University Law Review 207, 208–209. 
  
 
purpose, exemplified by Gaudron J’s dissenting judgment in 
Kruger.29 
 
 
Justice Gaudron argues: 
There are two matters, one textual, the other contextual, 
which… tell against construing s 116 as applying only to laws 
which, in terms, ban religious practices or otherwise prohibit 
the free exercise of religion…the need to construe guarantees 
so that they are not circumvented by allowing to be done 
indirectly what cannot be done directly has the consequence 
that s 116 extends to provisions which authorise acts which 
prevent the free exercise of religion, not merely provisions 
which operate of their own force to prevent that exercise.30 
 
Justice Gaudron disagreed with the explicit purpose requirement for 
textual and contextual reasons, arguing that it was an inappropriate 
approach to construing constitutional limits on Commonwealth 
legislative power as it could allow the Commonwealth to do 
indirectly what they could not do directly. She consequently held 
that s 116 extends to protect laws which operate to restrict free 
exercise of religion in their effect, not just those which explicitly 
ban it. The textual reason Gaudron J gives is that the clause 
explicitly states that it applies to laws which restrict the free exercise 
of religion, whether this is direct or indirect. If free exercise is in 
fact restricted by the operation of a Commonwealth law, then the 
clause should apply. 
 
                                                            
29  This approach is not without precedent before Kruger. In Adelaide 
Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc. v Commonwealth (1943) 67 
CLR 116 the Court mentioned that the purpose of the legislation may 
properly be taken into account, but a regulation which is neutral on its 
face yet burdens the free exercise of religion in its effect could offend 
the free exercise clause. See Mortenson, above n 14, 172–73; 
Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc. v Commonwealth 
(1943) 67 CLR 116, 136 (Latham CJ). 
30  Kruger v the Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 131–32 (Gaudron J). 
  
 
Contextually, Gaudron J argued that in any case, the 
Commonwealth has no power to make laws for the explicit purpose 
of prohibiting the free exercise of religion. This means that if the 
free exercise clause were only to effectively apply to laws which 
prohibit the free exercise clause in their terms, it would render the 
clause superfluous. Therefore, the free exercise clause must operate 
at a broader level than prohibiting laws which restrict free exercise 
as a matter of purpose; it must extend to also prohibiting laws which 
restrict free exercise in their indirect effect.31 Justice Gaudron’s 
interpretation is plausible, taking into account the text of the free 
exercise clause and demonstrating that the interpretation of the 
majority would render the free exercise clause superfluous. Since 
the clause should be understood as expressed and not read down to 
be merely cosmetic, it follows that Gaudron J’s approach may be the 
better approach.  
 
Expanding on Gaudron J’s approach in the dynamic context of 
same-sex marriage and anti-discrimination provisions, the remainder 
of this article develops related textual and contextual arguments for 
broadening the current understanding of prohibiting free exercise. 
The term ‘textual’ refers to the actual text and literal construction of 
the free exercise clause. The term ‘contextual’ refers to the general 
structure of the Constitution and the concerns which underpin 
interpretation of the structure and specific provisions. In particular, 
the contextual consideration of the implied freedom of political 
communication suggests an approach which prioritises democracy, 
allowing free exercise in the form of publicly expressing 
controversial religious views about same-sex marriage which may 
inform voting, and public religious practice as a form of civic 
participation. This contextual consideration implies that the current 
exemptions for religious organisations should be retained. 
Furthermore, the textual consideration that the free exercise clause 
makes no distinction between the free exercise of religion by 
religious organisations and free exercise of religion by religious 
individuals also implies that religious individuals should be granted 
                                                            
31  Evans, above n 14, 296; Kruger v the Commonwealth (1997) 190 
CLR 1, 131–32 (Gaudron J). 
  
 
the same anti-discrimination exemptions afforded to religious 
organisations in order to foster a robust and pluralistic democracy. 
 
 
III A CONTEXTUAL CONSIDERATION: IMPLIED FREEDOM OF 
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 
 
A Priority for Democracy 
It is generally accepted that free exercise of religion and the implied 
freedom of political communication intersect to protect the public 
expression of religious speech which may affect voting.32 This part 
of the article extends that contention to argue that the same concerns 
which underpin the implied freedom of political communication 
apply to the free exercise clause. It follows that there should be a 
broader approach to free exercise in order to facilitate representative 
democracy. Essentially, the article will present a normative 
                                                            
32  For background to the implied freedom, see Nationwide News Pty Ltd 
v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1; Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Lange v Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520. For analyses of the 
judgments, see Nicholas Aroney, ‘A Seductive Plausibility: Freedom 
of Speech in the Constitution’ (1994) 18 University of Queensland 
Law Journal 249, 249–51; Arthur Glass, ‘Freedom of Speech and the 
Constitution: Australian Capital Television and the Application of 
Constitutional Rights’ (1995) 17 Sydney Law Review 29, 32–35; 
Jeremy Kirk, ‘Constitutional Implications from Representative 
Democracy’ (1995) 23 Federal Law Review 37, 38–41. For reasoning 
consistent with an intersection between the implied freedom and the 
free exercise of religion, see, e.g. Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses Inc. v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116, 125–26 
(Latham CJ) where Latham CJ mentions the effect of faith on 
politics; Cf Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth (1992) 
177 CLR 106, 138–39 (Mason CJ); Nicholas Aroney, ‘The 
Constitutional (In) Validity of Religious Vilification Laws: 
Implications for their Interpretation’ (2006) 34 Federal Law Review 
287, 303; D Meagher, ‘What is “Political Communication”? The 
Rationale and Scope of the Implied Freedom of Political 
Communication’ (2004) 28 Melbourne University Law Review 438. 
  
 
argument, supported by High Court doctrine on the implied 
freedom, that interpretation of the Constitution is grounded in a 
‘priority for democracy’, and this priority is why the broader 
interpretation of the free exercise clause should be adopted.33 
Priority for democracy means all religious, philosophical and 
scientific voices (like votes) should be considered equally when it 
comes to decision-making.34 As Bader contends: 
Instead of trying to limit the content of discourse by keeping all 
contested comprehensive doctrines and truth-claims out, one 
has to develop the duties of civility, such as the duty to explain 
positions in publicly understandable language, the willingness 
to listen to others, fair-mindedness, and readiness to accept 
reasonable accommodations or alterations in one’s own view.35 
 
This is not the same as a ‘public reason’ requirement of the type 
advocated by, for example, John Rawls, who prescribes certain 
minimum standards of equal citizenship by effectively preventing 
the public discussion of contested comprehensive doctrines, both 
religious and secular.36 The focus is on creating a public space for 
free and fair discussion of contested views which are equally 
considered in the decision-making process. Allowing the 
opportunity for all views to be robustly proposed and debated in a 
civil manner is a primary feature of Australia’s democratic system. 
One may of course disagree with what is expressed, but the nature 
of democratic discourse is that all kinds of views should be able to 
be proposed. It follows that a priority for democracy model should 
explicitly allow for all religious or non-religious arguments 
compatible with the democratic process, leading to a pluralistic 
encounter of perspectives which will combine and contribute to 
policy-making and allow true liberal democracy – the freedom to 
                                                            
33  V Bader, ‘Religious Pluralism: Secularism or Priority for 
Democracy?’ (1999) 27 Political Theory 597, 612–13. 
34  Ibid 612–13. Cf for example Jeremy Waldron, Law and 
Disagreement (Oxford, 1999). 
35  Bader, above n 33, 614. 
36  See, e.g. John Rawls, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition 
(Columbia, 4th ed, 2011) 75. 
  
 
equally express and decide between a full array of perspectives, with 
the state promoting and excluding none.37 
 
What is required is a sensible balancing of the different claims, 
taking into account minority religions, majority religions, and those 
who follow no religion.38 Indeed, as their justification for implying 
the freedom of political communication, the judges in the leading 
cases rely on this idea of prioritising democracy, or the ‘principle 
that free speech will facilitate the discovery of truth and the 
influencing of values and will thus assist the voters to make a 
meaningful choice’.39 Free communication provides a broad scope 
of opinions on an even broader range of topics, all of which enable 
voters to discover the truth and implement their associated values in 
the political context: electing members of particular parties 
advocating particular policies. 
 
Deane and Toohey JJ argued as part of the majority in Nationwide 
News that the doctrine of representative government (government by 
representatives elected by and responsible to the Australian people) 
implicitly undergirds the Constitution.40 The justices contended that 
voters would be unable to discharge their constitutional obligation to 
choose their representatives if they were unable to communicate 
with each other about the background, qualifications and policies of 
the candidates and the ‘countless number’ of other factors which are 
relevant to consideration of the interests of the nation and the 
people.41 Consequently, Deane and Toohey JJ concluded that in the 
doctrine of representative government incorporated in the 
Constitution there exists an implication of free communication of 
                                                            
37  Bader, above n 33, 617. 
38  Ibid 608. 
39  Kirk, above n 32, 52. See also Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 138–40 (Mason CJ), 211–12 
(Gaudron J), 230–32 (McHugh J); Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills 
(1992) 177 CLR 1, 47–50 (Brennan J), 72 (Deane and Toohey JJ). 
40  Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 70 (Deane and 
Toohey JJ). 
41  Ibid 72 (Deane and Toohey JJ). 
  
 
information relating to the government of the Commonwealth.42 
Since the Constitution operates based on a system of representative 
government and representative government requires free 
communication to properly function, it follows that the Constitution 
implies a guarantee of free political communication so that 
responsible government can successfully occur.43 
 
Chief Justice Mason for the majority in Australian Capital 
Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (‘Australian Capital 
Television’)44 accepted the plaintiffs’ argument that since the 
Constitution assumes and effectively prescribes the doctrine of 
representative government, free political communication is 
necessarily implied by the Constitution as an essential corollary of 
that system.45 It is only by exercising this freedom that citizens can 
communicate their views ‘on the wide range of matters that may call 
for, or are relevant to, political action or decision’, and ‘criticise 
government actions’ and ‘call for change’, in this way influencing 
the policies and decisions of the elected representatives.46 For 
Mason CJ, the scope of communication covered and the freedom of 
various communicators is necessarily broad, and ‘in a representative 
democracy public participation in political discussion is a central 
element of the political process’.47 This representative sample of 
statements by the High Court indicates that the functioning of a 
representative democracy is a primary consideration in the 
development of the implied freedom. There must be a space for 
people to freely communicate politically relevant views, and this 
may entail disagreement, offence and irrationality. However, these 
                                                            
42  Ibid 72–73 (Deane and Toohey JJ). 
43  Aroney, above n 32, 249. 
44  (1992) 177 CLR 106. 
45  Ibid 136 (Mason CJ). 
46  Ibid 138 (Mason CJ). 
47  Ibid 139, 142 (Mason CJ). 
  
 
are necessary elements of a functioning democracy and are 
consistent with the Constitutional framework.48 
 
The fundamental point is that since communication on any subject 
matter may influence voting on that subject matter, and every 
subject matter is potentially able to become involved in political 
processes, communication on any subject may be considered 
political and therefore covered by the implied freedom.49 Ultimately, 
it is the substance of these communications which enables a voter to 
assess a government. For example, ‘people may form their political 
opinions by discussion of matters not on the political agenda, 
including matters like religion and philosophy that develop more 
fundamental commitments’.50 Just as the free exercise clause in s 
116 protects religiously motivated speech, so the implied freedom of 
political communication protects political speech. Since voters’ 
political predilections may be fundamentally influenced by their 
religious convictions and the expression of religious perspectives, it 
follows that the implied freedom of political communication 
operates to protect religious speech. 
 
Aroney also reasons that just as commercial, and entertainment 
speech may possess a relevantly political dimension attracting the 
constitutional protection, so may religious speech.51 He contends 
that ‘the free exercise clause in s 116 undoubtedly protects at least 
some (if not most) forms of religiously motivated speech, and may 
also protect communication about religion even if such speech is not 
religiously motivated’.52 This is the place where priority for 
democracy, which consistently undergirds the free exercise of 
                                                            
48  Glass, above n 31, 32; Levy v State of Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 
622–23 (McHugh J); Roberts v Bass (2002) 212 CLR 1, 44 [110] 
(Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
49  Kirk, above n 32, 53. 
50  Adrienne Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms: The Nature 
of the Freedom of Political Communication’ (2001) 25 Melbourne 
University Law Review 374, 389–90. 
51  Aroney, above n 32, 297. 
52  Ibid 303. 
  
 
religion and the implied freedom of political communication, 
becomes relevant. Insofar as religious exercise in s 116 consists of 
the public expression of religious views and conduct, it is a freedom 
which is similarly essential to representative democracy and 
therefore ought to be similarly protected from generally applicable 
laws. People may have regard to all manner of intellectual 
disciplines and resources in their political formation and public 
participation, including religion, and the freedom of political 
communication enables the free dispensation of this information as 
contributing to representative democracy. In the same way, priority 
for democracy provides the basis for arguing that Australia’s 
constitutionally mandated system of representative government 
means that a broader view of free exercise which allows for full and 
free public participation should be adopted. 
 
B The Constitutional Framework 
 
There are indications that this type of priority for democracy model 
was assumed by the framers of the Constitution in relation to s 116. 
The emphasis in the pre-federation constitutional debates 
surrounding s 116 was on the protection of the free exercise of 
religion from impedance by the state, juxtaposed with the 
community expectation that the state would not privilege one 
religion over another.53 For example, both Higgins and Barton were 
careful to emphasise that the mention of God in the preamble on one 
hand did not mean that people’s rights with respect to religion 
would be interfered with on the other, and that there would be ‘no 
infraction of religious liberty’ by the Commonwealth.54 
 
For the framers, rather than a strict insistence on the state as a 
secular entity which excluded public religion, what was important 
was the state avoiding the promotion of religion which would cause 
                                                            
53  McLeish, above n 28, 219. 
54  1898 Australasian Federation Conference Third Session Debates, 
Melbourne, 17 March 1898, 2474 (H B Higgins and Hon Edmund 
Barton). 
  
 
sectarian division in the community.55 It was actually felt that the 
community as a whole should have a religious character, but this 
religious character would be hindered by explicit state 
involvement.56 There should be a state impartiality towards religion, 
reflected both in the avoidance of religious preference and the 
protection of individual and group autonomy in matters of religion 
as participants in the wider community.57 Religious identities are not 
treated impartially by declaring that religious conduct is a private 
matter or by excluding religious arguments from political and 
constitutional debates.58 For example, for Mortenson it seems 
inconsistent with prioritising democracy that those who adhere to a 
secular worldview may be able to publicly express themselves in 
policy debate in terms of their secularism, but those who adhere to a 
religious worldview may not be able to so express themselves in 
terms of their religion.59 
 
After all, there are many extra-political factors which influence 
public policy, such as economics, morality and culture. Any denial 
of religious discourse without addressing other external influences 
would seem to constitute hostility toward religion specifically, 
undermining its free exercise.60 True ‘impartiality’ toward religion, 
therefore, includes the state not acting to impede the autonomy of 
individuals or groups making and pursuing religious choices. There 
are certainly valid limits to expressive conduct and unnecessarily 
offensive material, as well as restrictions on insolent modes of 
expression. However, to effectively equate disagreement with 
incommensurability or offense worthy of restriction is a grave 
mistake, particularly in a robust democracy where disagreement on 
                                                            
55  McLeish, above n 28, 221–22. 
56  Ibid 222. 
57  Ibid 223. 
58  See Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘Why we would reject what liberalism 
tells us etc.?’ in P Weithman (ed), Religion and Contemporary 
Liberalism (Notre Dame, 1997) 162–81. 
59  Reid Mortenson, ‘The Establishment Clause: A Search for Meaning’ 
(2014) 33(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 109, 124–25. 
60  McLeish, above n 28, 228. 
  
 
all manner of deeply held incommensurable beliefs and conduct (not 
limited to religion) is ubiquitous. 
 
These notions are reflected in the intention of at least one framer. 
Symon states that through s 116, the framers are ‘giving… 
assertion… to the principle that religion or no religion is not to be a 
bar in any way to the full rights of citizenship, and that everybody is 
to be free to profess and hold any faith he [sic] likes’.61 To profess a 
faith presumably includes public expression of that faith in words 
and conduct; otherwise, the distinction made between holding a 
faith and professing a faith is superfluous.62 
 
Many of the framers did not desire a secular society which rejected 
the public display and discourse of religion. The historical and 
cultural context of the development of s 116 was a general 
endorsement of religion and a climate of tolerance based on a 
concern for the advancement of religion.63 Consequently, the 
purpose undergirding s 116 was ‘the preservation of neutrality in the 
federal government’s relations with religion so that full membership 
of a pluralistic community is not dependent on religious positions’.64 
This is reflected in Symon’s statement that ‘what we want in these 
times is to protect every citizen in the absolute and free exercise of 
his own faith, to take care that his religious belief shall in no way be 
interfered with’.65 
 
Thus, a narrow view of the free exercise clause as only preventing 
laws which directly restrict free exercise seems to be inconsistent 
                                                            
61 1898 Australasian Federation Conference Third Session Debates, 
Melbourne, 8 February 1898, 660 (J H Symon).  
62  See Moens, above n 16, 216. 
63  J Puls, ‘Wall of Separation: Section 116, the First Amendment and 
Constitutional Religious Guarantees’ (1998) 26 Federal Law Review 
139, 140. 
64  Ibid 151; Cf Gabriel Moens, ‘The Menace of Neutrality in Religion’ 
(2004) 5(1) Brigham Young University Law Review 525. 
65 1898 Australasian Federation Conference Third Session Debates,   
Melbourne, 8 February 1898, 659 (J H Symon).  
  
 
with prioritising an authentically democratic culture encouraging 
full public and political engagement. If indirect restriction of free 
exercise is allowed through generally applicable laws, as it currently 
is, the result is religious individuals and organisations will be unduly 
burdened in their religious practice (as occurred for Indigenous 
Australians in Kruger and the Jehovah’s Witnesses organisation in 
that case), and it follows that these religious people or organisations 
will not be able to fully participate as citizens in a democratic 
society.66 Priority for democracy demands an approach to free 
exercise that allows citizens to fully participate in democratic 
society despite their religious beliefs and practice, just as priority for 
democracy demands an approach to political communication which 
allows the public expression of religious perspectives to create a 
free and informed choice at an election. 
 
 
 
C Democracy and Free Exercise 
 
Even prior to the High Court articulating the implied freedom of 
political communication, similar principles of prioritising 
democracy and civic participation informed interpretation of the free 
exercise clause. For example, speaking of Griffith CJ’s construction 
of s 116 in Krygger v Williams,67 which distinguished between 
protected beliefs and unprotected public acts consequent on those 
beliefs, Hogan states that ‘such an interpretation, which would make 
“religion” apply only to the internal forum, with no relevance to 
public acts, would make s 116 a complete mockery’.68 This 
extremely narrow interpretation has been rejected by the High 
                                                            
66  See e.g. Valerie Kerruish, ‘Responding to Kruger: The 
Constitutionality of Genocide’ (1998) 11(1) Australian Feminist Law 
Journal 65, 67–68. 
67  (1912) 15 CLR 366. 
68  Michael Hogan, ‘Separation of Church and State: Section 116 of the 
Australian Constitution’ (1981) 53(2) The Australian Quarterly 214, 
219–20. 
  
 
Court.69 Despite Latham CJ’s efforts in Jehovah’s Witnesses to 
show that s 116 protects acts done in pursuance of religion as well 
as the possessing of religious opinion, he also observed that: 
Section 116, however, is based upon the principle that religion 
should, for political purposes, be regarded as irrelevant. It 
assumes that citizens of all religions can be good citizens, and 
that accordingly there is no justification in the interests of the 
community for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion.70 
 
This could be read as Latham CJ espousing the separation of 
religion and politics, but such an interpretation seems incongruent 
with the rest of his judgment. Chief Justice Latham provided a 
number of different religious examples illustrating the opposing 
contention that faith is not completely separate from politics.71 
Rather, Latham CJ can be understood as arguing for a true state 
impartiality – not the strict separation of religion and politics, but 
the equal promotion (or at least, the equal lack of prohibition) of the 
free exercise of any religion.72 His reasoning is that since all citizens 
of any religion or non-religion can be good citizens and participate 
appropriately in the democratic process, there is no basis as a matter 
of citizenship for restricting the free exercise of religion in general, 
or the free exercise of any religion in particular. As Mason ACJ and 
Brennan J state in Church of the New Faith, ‘[f]reedom of religion, 
the paradigm freedom of conscience, is of the essence of a free 
                                                            
69  Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc. v Commonwealth 
(1943) 67 CLR 116, 124–25 (Latham CJ). See also the agreement 
expressed by Clifford Pannam, ‘Travelling Section 116 with a US 
Road Map’ (1963) 4 Melbourne University Law Review 41, 65–67. 
70  Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc. v Commonwealth 
(1943) 67 CLR 116, 126 (Latham CJ). 
71  See Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc. v Commonwealth 
(1943) 67 CLR 116, 125–26 (Latham CJ). 
72  See Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth 
(1943) 67 CLR 116, 125–26 (Latham CJ); Cf Aroney’s implicit 
agreement and clarification of Latham CJ’s position in Aroney, above 
n 32, 301–302. 
  
 
society’.73 Promoting a free society is an essential aspect of 
prioritising democracy. Thus, freedom of religion is a necessary 
component of prioritising democracy. 
 
Pannam therefore concludes that ‘section 116 guarantees the right to 
disbelief. It does not allow a non-believer to force his [sic] disbelief 
on others… His [sic] voice may be raised in the legislature against 
the merits of governmental assistance, it cannot be heard in the 
courts to prevent it’.74 It is through public participation in the 
democratic process by religions that government actions in relation 
to religious belief and action can be determined. Importantly, the 
pieces by Hogan and Pannam were both written before the High 
Court articulated the implied freedom of political communication 
and therefore they cannot be taken as explicitly advocating a 
relationship between the two freedoms. However, they at least 
anticipate a willingness to accept freedom of religion as extending 
to external actions based on belief if these actions are compatible 
with the democratic process. 
 
More precisely, freedom of religion should extend to protect all 
external actions which are not dangerous to society or democracy, 
even if those views or actions are deemed unpopular according to 
community values.75 As Latham CJ observes, ‘section 116 is 
required to protect the religion (or absence of religion) of minorities, 
and in particular, of unpopular minorities’.76 This protection of the 
external expressions or actions of unpopular views is consistent with 
the implied freedom and indicates that the principle of prioritising 
democracy which undergirds the implied freedom should also result 
in a broader approach to free exercise.77 Since a democracy should 
                                                            
73  Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax (1983) 154 
CLR 120, 130 (Mason ACJ and Brennan J). 
74  Pannam, above n 69, 86. 
75  See Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth 
(1943) 67 CLR 116, 149–50 (Rich J). 
76  Ibid 124 (Latham CJ). 
77  Cf Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1; Monis v The Queen (2013) 
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allow for the expression of all views compatible with democracy as 
a matter of freedom and equality (even if they are unpopular), in the 
same way, a democracy should allow for the public expression of 
religious perspectives and practice compatible with democracy – 
particularly given the presence of the free exercise clause. 
 
All this begs the question of how the free exercise clause would 
mean protection for a wider field of activity than the implied 
freedom of political communication. Given that the scope of the 
implied freedom is extremely broad, covering communicative 
conduct as well as speech, it could be objected that the role of s 116 
is merely artificial. According to the assumptions of prioritising 
democracy, any public expression of religious views or conduct is 
covered by the implied freedom, excluding any role for the free 
exercise clause.78 However, the types of conduct potentially covered 
by the free exercise clause extend beyond the kinds of conduct 
covered by the implied freedom. These include indirect restriction 
of free exercise such as in Kruger, the ability of religious 
organisations to choose employees consistent with their religious 
doctrine, and the ability of religious individuals to conduct 
themselves and their businesses consistent with their religious 
convictions. Such conduct potentially falls within the scope of free 
exercise, but is not, at least ostensibly, politically relevant and is 
therefore outside the scope of the implied freedom. This leaves a 
unique role for the free exercise clause. 
 
Zimmermann helpfully conceives the relationship between the two 
freedoms in the sense that an implied freedom of communication on 
religious grounds exists which is derived from the implied freedom 
of political communication, and from the same motivation of 
prioritising democracy.79 Using the principles undergirding the 
                                                            
78  Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 
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implied freedom (which have been consistently endorsed by the 
High Court) to provide the conceptual and contextual framework for 
interpreting the free exercise clause allows an expanded view of free 
exercise, facilitating public expression of religious conduct and 
perspectives for the purpose of prioritising democracy. The 
reasoning undergirding the implied freedom of political 
communication is significant when it comes to the tension between 
religious freedom and anti-discrimination. Based on the argument in 
this part that unduly restricting free exercise undermines democracy, 
anti-discrimination legislation which burdens the free religious 
exercise of individuals and organisations in its effect as well as its 
purpose could be held invalid as breaching s 116. This fundamental 
contention is developed in the following parts. 
 
IV A TENSE UNION: FREEDOMS AND DISCRIMINATION IN A SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE CONTEXT 
 
To reiterate, the free exercise clause is a protection against 
Commonwealth laws which restrict or prohibit the free exercise of 
religion.80 The implied freedom of political communication is a 
protection against Commonwealth (and State) laws which restrict 
political communication.81 In order to invoke the freedoms, there 
must be specific Commonwealth legislation impugned as 
inconsistent with them or seeking to restrict them. Here, the tension 
or potential inconsistency exists between religious freedom and anti-
discrimination laws relating to sexual orientation and marital status 
in a context where same-sex marriage may be legalised. In this 
situation, it is possible that the legalisation of same-sex marriage 
and the operation of corresponding anti-discrimination legislation 
could result in a restriction of free exercise. This part will outline the 
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relevant Commonwealth law which may be inconsistent with the 
free exercise clause. 
 
Marriage is currently defined in s 5(1) of the Marriage Act 1961 
(Cth) as ‘the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all 
others, voluntarily entered into for life’. In a context where same-
sex marriage is legalised, an amendment might define marriage as 
‘the union of two persons to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily 
entered into for life’. This would effectively allow both different-sex 
(traditional) and same-sex marriage. The Commonwealth anti-
discrimination legislation considered will be the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1984 (Cth) (‘the Act’). Section 5A of the Act states that 
discrimination occurs on the ground of sexual orientation where, in 
equal circumstances, the aggrieved person is treated less favourably 
than a person of a different sexual orientation by reason of the 
aggrieved person’s sexual orientation. Section 6 of the Act provides 
an equivalent provision for discrimination on the ground of marital 
or relationship status. 
 
Sections 14 to 27 of the Act provide for instances of discrimination 
in specific areas. For example, s 14(1) of the Act states ‘it is 
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a person on the 
ground of the person’s… “sexual orientation” or “marital or 
relationship status”’ in ‘determining who should be offered 
employment or in the terms and conditions on which employment is 
offered’, or ‘by dismissing the employee’. Section 22(1) of the Act 
provides that ‘it is unlawful for a person who, whether for payment 
or not, provides goods or services, or makes facilities available, to 
discriminate against another person on the ground of the other 
person’s… “sexual orientation” or “marital or relationship status” 
by ‘refusing to provide the other person with those goods or services 
or to make those facilities available to the other person’. 
Sections 37 and 38 of the Act provide exemptions for religious 
bodies and educational institutions established for religious 
purposes. Section 37(1) states that none of the sections outlined 
above affect the ordination, appointment, training or selection of 
members of any religious order, or any other act or practice of a 
body established for religious purposes which conforms to the 
  
 
doctrines of that religion or is necessary to avoid injury to the 
religious susceptibilities of adherents of that religion. 
Similarly, s 38(1) specifies that nothing in the relevant paragraphs of 
s 14 renders it unlawful for a person to discriminate on the ground 
of sexual orientation or marital status in connection with 
employment as a member of an education institution conducted in 
accordance with the doctrines of a particular religion. Alternatively, 
s 14 does not apply if the discrimination occurs in good faith and is 
necessary to avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities of 
adherents of that religion. These anti-discrimination provisions 
comprise the Commonwealth legislation which will be considered in 
the analysis of the free exercise clause in the following parts. 
In a typical scenario, a minister of religion, as an agent for a 
religious institution, might refuse to provide a service to another 
because of their sexual orientation. Their reason is providing such a 
service is not in accordance with their religion. Following the 
legislation just outlined, such a case would be relatively 
straightforward. The minister would have discriminated in 
accordance with s 22 (1), but because their action conforms to the 
doctrine of the religion and falls within the exemption, a claim 
would not be successful. There is no need to directly invoke the free 
exercise clause in order to claim that the Commonwealth legislation 
is invalid. This is an example of the Commonwealth’s attempt to 
balance religious freedom with anti-discrimination, and the 
exemption is a generous allowance for the free exercise of religion 
in this context. 
 
However, these generous exemptions exist specifically for bodies or 
organisations (educational or other) established for religious 
purposes. As discussed in the following parts, even these 
exemptions have been questioned.82 Furthermore, exemptions do not 
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exist for individuals attempting to freely exercise their religion. It is 
this kind of situation where the text of the free exercise clause in s 
116 and a more expansive interpretation ought to be duly 
considered. In particular, a textual consideration seems to require 
that religious institutions, organisations established for religious 
purposes, and religious individuals should be protected from laws 
which prohibit the free exercise of their religion in their purpose or 
their effect. 
V TEXTUAL AND CONTEXTUAL CONSIDERATIONS: EXPLORING THE 
BOUNDARIES OF FREE EXERCISE 
 
A Protecting Free Exercise: The Religious Organisation 
 
Evans and Ujvari consider this controversial question of the extent 
to which religious schools, as examples of religious organisations, 
should be exempt from non-discrimination laws that would apply to 
state schools.83 Their work also raises important broader points 
about discrimination, religious freedom and generally applicable 
laws which are worth considering. They agree that what is most 
relevant is the situation where discrimination occurs on the basis of 
conflict with religious teachings, such as where a staff member is 
gay or lesbian, or, hypothetically, in a same-sex marriage.84 In 
considering arguments for allowing exemptions from non-
discrimination law, Evans and Ujvari discuss religious freedom in 
the context of international conventions, but interestingly do not 
raise the free exercise clause in s 116.85 It could, perhaps, be 
accepted that ‘schools generally fall under the jurisdiction of state 
and territory laws’, and therefore s 116 is inapplicable and not 
mentioned for that reason.86 However, as Evans and Ujvari 
specifically state, the fact that ‘some educational institutions are 
subject to Commonwealth law’ and ‘Commonwealth statutes 
prohibit specific forms of discrimination’ means that 
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Commonwealth jurisdiction should be discussed ‘for the sake of 
completeness’.87 It is problematic that analysis of s 116 is 
inexplicably omitted, particularly given what follows. 
 
In noting arguments against allowing exemptions from non-
discrimination law, Evans and Ujvari make the point (again without 
mentioning s 116) that the right to religious freedom is limited.88 
The existence of exemptions indicates an attempt to balance the 
competing interests of freedom of religion and non-discrimination. 
Resolution of this tension and the precise point of balance reached 
will depend upon the ‘assumptions of various proponents about 
which value should prevail’.89 With respect, though balancing the 
value of freedom through a right to free exercise against the value of 
equality through a right to non-discrimination is certainly a 
significant consideration, in a Commonwealth context it is also 
necessary to consider the Constitutional framework provided by the 
free exercise clause in s 116.  
 
Moreover, articulating the boundaries of free exercise has important 
implications for weighing the competing values, particularly if the 
High Court adheres to the kind of broad priority for democracy 
reasoning which undergirds the implied freedom of political 
communication. If maintaining the constitutionally prescribed 
system of representative government (democracy) is paramount, this 
would seem to contextually imply that a more expansive 
interpretation of free exercise is appropriate, since this would 
facilitate equal civic participation of various perspectives. 
 
More emphatically, as Mortenson contends, the right to free exercise 
in the Constitution ‘does not suggest a “balance” to be struck 
between anti-discrimination standards and rights of religious liberty, 
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but a constitutionally required preference for religious liberty’.90 
This view is implicitly supported by a High Court which has 
expanded its interpretation of constitutional liberties such as the 
implied freedom of political communication.91 It appears that Evans 
and Ujvari are not the only analysts to neglect the influence of s 116 
in this context of religious exemptions to non-discrimination 
provisions. Writing of the discussions that occurred as part of the 
drafting process for the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), 
Mortenson mentions that ‘it is… disturbing to find that, when 
advising the Commonwealth on this very problem, both the Sex 
Discrimination Commissioner and the Law Reform Commission 
failed even to mention the possible impact of s 116’.92 
 
In the particular instance of educational institutions operating for 
religious reasons, there is an appropriate balance given that there are 
generous exemptions for discrimination in accordance with religious 
doctrine. This provides for free exercise of religion in conjunction 
with non-discrimination. However, the general failure to take into 
account the free exercise clause and the corresponding 
constitutionally required preference for religious liberty suggested 
by s 116 is a broader problem which will become more exposed as 
tensions between religious freedom and non-discrimination increase. 
The indication by certain politicians or political parties that they 
may reduce or remove these kinds of exemptions, or do not consider 
that there is any relation between religious freedom and same-sex 
marriage, is an example of this problem. The problem is also 
apparent when it comes to the religious freedom of individuals. 
 
B Protecting Free Exercise: The Religious Individual 
 
For example, a religious person may run a small business which 
normally provides services in accordance with their religious 
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beliefs, and then refuse to provide a requested service to a same-sex 
couple because it will conflict with their religious beliefs.93 This 
would be discrimination under s 22 (1). However, such a person 
cannot rely on the exemptions under ss 37(1) or 38(1). Though they 
may have a consistent practice of refusing jobs which would tend to 
injure their religious susceptibilities in accordance with the teaching 
of their religion, the business would probably not be viewed as an 
educational institution or a body established for religious purposes. 
 
There is growing literature on both sides of this vexed question of 
individual religious conscience in commercial settings as new cases 
are raised. However, the majority of them are in the United States 
context and so discussion of this issue is subject to the Supreme 
Court interpretation of free exercise in the United States 
Constitution, as well as any relevant United States state legislation 
on religious freedom, conscience and anti-discrimination.94 Though 
this article focuses specifically on the Australian context, there are 
advocates for special legislative exemptions for religious small 
business owners, especially given the United States Supreme 
Court’s position that any law contravening the free exercise clause 
                                                            
93  See e.g. Lee v Ashers Baking Co Ltd [2015] NICty 2. 
94  See e.g. Michael Kent Curtis, ‘A Unique Religious Exemption from 
Anti-Discrimination Laws in the case of gays? Putting the Call for 
Exemptions for Those Who Discriminate against Married or 
Marrying Gays in Context’ cited in Michael Kent Curtis (ed), The 
Rule of Law and the Rule of God (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Roger 
Severino, ‘Or for Poorer: How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens 
Religious Liberty’ (2006) 30 Harvard Journal of Law and Public 
Policy 939; Douglas NeJaime, ‘Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex 
Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual 
Orientation Discrimination’ (2012) 100(5) California Law Review 
1169; Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sagar, ‘The Vulnerability 
of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious 
Conduct’ (1994) 61(4) The University of Chicago Law Review 1245; 
Steven Jamar, ‘Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled 
Approach to Title VII and Religious Freedom’ (1996) 40 New York 
Law School Law Review 719. 
  
 
must focus on ‘belief’, not ‘effect on conduct’.95 Consistent with the 
Australian situation, generally applicable laws which indirectly 
restrict free exercise are allowed. 
 
For example, Berg argues that the same features which support the 
legalisation of same-sex marriage also support religious exemptions 
for individuals, particularly the common desire for religious 
individuals and same-sex couples to express their commitments 
(which are fundamental to their identity) in a public, holistic way. 
For the same-sex couple it is their love and fidelity to their partner, 
and for the religious individual it is their love and fidelity to the 
object of their religion, but in both cases the parties are claiming a 
right beyond private behavior which extends to all aspects of their 
public lives.96 When religious individuals are prevented from 
publicly expressing their religion through conduct related to their 
social and business interactions, and when same-sex couples are 
prevented from publicly expressing their orientation and 
relationship, both are being ‘told to keep their identities in the 
closet. Anyone who takes the claims of same-sex couples seriously 
must also give substantial weight to the religious objectors’.97 
 
Promoting equality and liberty are essential features of prioritising 
democracy. Though anti-discrimination laws are directed at 
addressing inequalities such as discrimination against same-sex 
couples, religious individuals also have a relevant appeal to equality. 
Generally applicable laws, such as anti-discrimination legislation, 
‘fall disproportionately’ or unequally on those whose religious 
practices conflict with them.98 Those who do not engage in religious 
belief or practice are not subject to the same practical restrictions 
resulting from the laws. The need to allow for religious liberty, as 
part of a functioning democracy, is precisely why there ought to be 
                                                            
95  Thomas Berg, ‘What Same-Sex Marriage Claims and Religious 
Liberty Claims Have in Common’ (2010) 5(2) Northwestern Journal 
of Law and Social Policy 206, 214. 
96  Ibid 207–208, 215–16. 
97  Ibid 218. 
98  Ibid 225. 
  
 
exemptions for religious individuals running small businesses or 
charitable organisations.99 Small businesses that provide personal 
services are often direct embodiments of the owner’s identity, and if 
the owner feels direct responsibility for conduct to which they 
object on religious grounds, accommodations should be provided. 
To refuse such exemptions is to imply that religion should not be 
connected to business, and this imposes a considerable burden on 
those who wish to integrate their lives and identities.100 
 
In the Australian context, such exemptions are not currently 
available. The religious individual running a business might attempt 
to invoke the free exercise clause to claim that this Commonwealth 
legislation restricts their free exercise of religion. However, based 
on the majority judgment in Kruger, the High Court would probably 
hold that the Act does not have the restriction or regulation of 
religion as part of its purpose, and therefore the validity of the 
legislation would be upheld. The fact that general religious 
exemptions are included in the legislation would also support that 
finding because free exercise has arguably been catered for. 
Nevertheless, the legislation has the effect of restricting free 
exercise by not allowing the religious person to refuse a job which 
injures their religious susceptibilities. This is one reason why the 
purpose or effect approach is too narrow. It allows Commonwealth 
anti-discrimination legislation to indirectly restrict the free exercise 
of religion for individuals in particular. 
 
Focusing on the text of the free exercise clause is telling. The clause 
says that the Commonwealth ‘shall not make any law…for 
                                                            
99  Ibid 208. 
100  Ibid 227–28. Berg cogently addresses a series of further objections to 
the view that exemptions should be extended to religious individuals 
at 228–35. In particular, he considers the claim that religious 
objectors can simply switch professions, limits on the exemptions for 
individuals in a commercial environment, and the greater harm 
suffered by legal sanctions against objectors than that suffered by 
those refused a service. This author has nothing to add to that 
analysis. 
  
 
prohibiting the free exercise of religion’. Critically, there is no 
mention of a distinction between religious individuals and religious 
organisations or organisations established for religious purposes. 
The clause explicitly states that where there is a prohibition of free 
exercise, the clause should apply to invalidate the law – whether or 
not the prohibition involves individuals or organisations. It follows 
from the text that if exemptions are granted to organisations to 
implement the free exercise of religion, as they currently are, 
exemptions should also be granted to individuals so that the clause 
is properly implemented. 
 
It is true that some state anti-discrimination legislation provides 
exemptions for religious individuals, and s 10 of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) states that state laws remain 
applicable.101 So in effect, one could say that religious individuals 
are protected to at least this extent. However, since s 116 applies 
only to Commonwealth laws and not to state laws, such state 
protection is serendipitous and mutable rather than a principled 
acknowledgement of religious freedom grounded in a Constitutional 
provision. Protections for the religious freedom of individuals vary 
from state to state and can be restricted or removed at any time 
without the limit of Constitutional protection. State exemptions are 
therefore an unreliable version of protection for the religious 
freedom of individuals (or organisations). 
 
Importantly in the Commonwealth constitutional context, an 
exemption for religious individuals would merely be a protection. It 
would not give rise to an enforceable individual right or individual 
cause of action, just as the exemptions for organisations are a 
protection rather than a right or cause of action, and just as the 
implied freedom of political communication does not give rise to an 
enforceable individual right or cause of action.102 The potential 
applicability of the implied freedom returns us to the contextual 
question of justifying proposed exemptions for Commonwealth anti-
                                                            
101  See e.g. Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (VIC) s 84. 
102  This is explained more in Part VI. See e.g. Lange v Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
  
 
discrimination legislation to account for the religious freedom of 
individuals, based in a broader view of free exercise, which is in 
turn influenced by the priority for democracy reasoning 
undergirding the implied freedom of political communication. The 
implied freedom does not seem to be directly applicable to the 
religious individual running a business, since they are not engaging 
in politically relevant conduct or speech (at least in a way which is 
intrinsic to the business – though one could potentially imagine a 
business operating politically through advertising or financially 
supporting a policy platform), and so it is outside the scope of this 
situation. The fact that some religious ‘conduct’ is beyond the scope 
of the implied freedom does not contradict the earlier statement all 
religious speech could be political, for not all conduct is speech. 
 
However, if it is assumed that the High Court wishes to facilitate 
robust political engagement to further democracy, as the 
justification for the implied freedom of political communication 
indicates, the fact that some religious conduct would not attract the 
protection of the implied freedom does not mean the principles 
underlying the freedom (priority for democracy) do not have 
implications for allowing the free expression of religious individuals 
in a democracy. In other words, a general constitutional approach 
for prioritising democracy could provide a framework for expanding 
(or at least maintaining) religious freedoms in a democracy. The 
priority for democracy approach endorsed by the High Court 
involves the interaction of various, conflicting perspectives from the 
different cultures and traditions which inform the voting process: a 
pluralist framework.103 This approach facilitates free and equal 
                                                            
103  See e.g. Tim Soutphommasane, ‘Grounding Multicultural 
Citizenship: From Minority Rights to Civic Pluralism’ (2006) 26(4) 
Journal of Intercultural Studies 401. This is distinct from something 
like an egalitarian notion of citizenship, which tends to remove 
identity markers. See e.g. Harry Brighouse, ‘Egalitarianism and Equal 
Availability of Political Influence’ (1996) 4(2) Journal of Political 
Philosophy 118. There is a significant literature on citizenship and 
democracy which, due to scope, cannot be engaged with here. A 
pluralist priority for democracy framework is assumed because this 
 
  
 
political engagement and public displays of conduct which may not 
be agreed to by all, but can fairly be evaluated by all in the pursuit 
of democracy. This specifically includes public religious speech and 
conduct which may come into conflict with anti-discrimination law. 
Mortenson observes: 
However, one inherent paradox in all discrimination laws is 
that, although they aim to protect social pluralism, the 
principles of equality they usually promote also present a threat 
to the protection of religious pluralism in the political sphere. 
This occurs when, despite the traditional recognition of rights 
of religious liberty, the discrimination laws apply to religious 
groups that deny the moral imperatives of, say, racial, gender 
or sexual orientation equality. In this respect, Caesar has 
generally been prepared to render something to God through 
the complex exemptions granted in the discrimination laws to 
religious groups and religious educational or health 
institutions.104 
 
Mortenson recognises this tension between free exercise and anti-
discrimination in a pluralist context, and acknowledges that the state 
has been prepared to concede discrimination exemptions to religious 
organisations and institutions to promote pluralism. However, even 
Mortenson does not address exemptions applying to individuals 
freely exercising their religion. The same reasoning allowing 
exemptions for religious bodies and institutions could also allow 
similar exemptions for individuals. A democracy is composed of 
individuals and the plurality is formed by the interaction of 
conflicting individual perspectives as well as conflicting group 
perspectives. It would not be compatible with democratic and 
pluralist principles to curtail the dynamic interaction of individual 
people and perspectives by not allowing these individuals to freely 
exercise their religion due to anti-discrimination legislation. 
However, to remain consistent, exemptions for individuals should 
be of the type afforded to organisations or institutions. 
                                                                                                                 
seems most consistent with the High Court’s understanding of 
representative democracy in Australia, as argued in Part III. 
104  Mortenson, above n 90, 231. 
  
 
 
For example, the religious person could appeal to a provision which 
states that individuals who refuse to offer goods or services in a 
situation where to do so would conflict with the doctrine and 
practice of their religion, or who would have their religious 
susceptibilities offended were they compelled to offer the good or 
service in that situation, are not subject to the anti-discrimination 
provisions unless the refusal directly results in ‘concrete hardship’ 
for those who seek the service (that is, if there is no equivalent 
service reasonably available).105 This more expansive protection of 
free exercise complements the implied freedom. The implied 
freedom protects religious communication as a category of political 
communication contributing to democracy. If religious 
communication did not contribute to democracy as a general 
principle, it would hardly attract the protection. Hence, as a matter 
of context, to expand the free exercise protection to individuals in an 
anti-discrimination context is more consistent with the general 
priority for democracy undergirding the implied freedom of political 
communication. This claim, then, finally brings us to the 
fundamental consideration: how broadly the free exercise clause in s 
116 specifically should be interpreted within this dynamic context of 
anti-discrimination law, bearing in mind priority for democracy. 
 
VI EXPANSIONS AND LIMITS: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND EQUALITY 
IN OUR DEMOCRACY 
 
To recapitulate, Mortenson notes that if the free exercise clause 
were ‘given a more substantive operation’, this would have an 
impact on Commonwealth discrimination laws, particularly given 
the exemptions are often untested and ambiguous.106 At the very 
least, s 116 would seem to require discrimination laws to have some 
sort of religious exemption. In particular, based on United States 
case law, Mortenson asserts that to ‘honour rights of religious 
liberty, religious groups are probably entitled to broad exemptions 
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from the operation of sexual orientation discrimination laws’.107 
Though proposed reforms to the Act overlooked the possible 
constraints in s 116, preferring to focus on international 
conventions, they did possess generous exemptions of the kind 
envisaged by s 116.108 But again, and this is evident in Mortenson’s 
statement, these exemptions are only for religious organisations or 
institutions operating for religious purposes. The same protection is 
not given to individuals. 
 
Perhaps this is because the High Court has characterised s 116 as a 
limit on Commonwealth power, rather than as an individual right 
which would give rise to a cause of action.109 Accepting the 
presumption that it would be inappropriate to interpret the free 
exercise so broadly as to characterise it as a right giving rise to a 
cause of action, it does not follow that the free exercise clause 
cannot be interpreted as prohibiting Commonwealth action which 
restricts the free exercise of individuals, as well as religious bodies 
or organisations established for religious purposes. It could be 
understood as a limitation on the Commonwealth exercising 
legislative power against both religious organisations and religious 
individuals, and even if the High Court has not found any breach of 
the clause, the Court has historically understood it as applying to 
individuals as well as organisations.110 The corollary of this in the 
anti-discrimination context is that there seems to be no reason why 
religious individuals should not also receive protection through anti-
discrimination exemptions. 
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On the question of whether a law infringes the free exercise clause, 
Gaudron J specifically articulates the test to be adopted when stating 
‘the criterion of invalidity selected by s 116’.111 Legislative 
‘purpose… is the only matter to be taken into account in 
determining whether a law infringes s 116’.112 Gaudron J contends 
that: 
A law will not be a law for ‘prohibiting the free exercise of any 
religion’, notwithstanding that, in terms, it does just that or that 
it operates directly with that consequence, if it is necessary to 
attain some overriding public purpose or to satisfy some 
pressing social need… whether the interference with religious 
freedom, if any, effected… was appropriate and adapted or, 
which is the same thing, proportionate to the protection and 
preservation of those people. And as the purpose of a law is to 
be determined by reference to ‘the facts with which it deals’, 
that question would necessarily have to be answered by 
reference to the conditions of the time in which it operated. 
However, the answer to the question depends on an analysis of 
the law's operation, not on subjective views and perceptions.113 
 
It is important to distinguish between the majority’s view of purpose 
and Gaudron J’s view of purpose as the only matter to be taken into 
account. When the majority in Kruger talks about purpose, they are 
referring to the sole and explicit purpose of the impugned legislation 
being to restrict or regulate religion. Justice Gaudron incorporates 
the effect of a law into her understanding of a law’s purpose as part 
of examining how the law actually operates; this is emphasised by 
her caution that any analysis of purpose must be conducted in the 
context of the specific case. She then discusses the need for 
proportionality in determining whether a law infringes s 116 – 
where a law by the Commonwealth actually (in effect as well as 
purpose) operates to restrict the free exercise of religion, but is 
reasonably capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to 
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achieving some legitimate overriding public purpose, that law will 
be valid.114 
 
After all, the claim for a more expansive interpretation of free 
exercise is not to say that there should be no limits at all to free 
exercise. All the justices who have considered this issue have 
concluded that free exercise of religion is not absolute. As 
mentioned in Part II, not every interference with religion is a breach 
of s 116, but only those which ‘unduly infringe’ upon religious 
freedom, and restrictions on violent ‘religious’ conduct (such as 
murder or sacrifice) incompatible with democracy are necessary.115 
 
Evans and Ujvari hold that those who oppose anti-discrimination 
exemptions for religious groups may ‘legitimately question’ this 
asymmetry which allows laws regarding murder and sacrifice to 
apply to religious organisations, but sex discrimination laws not to 
apply. They argue that such an asymmetry implies that 
‘discrimination is relatively minor compared to other forms of harm 
[murder and sacrifice]’ and ‘equality is a goal of limited value’.116 
With respect, the assertion that discrimination is relatively minor 
compared to murder and sacrifice is technically correct. It seems 
absurd to advocate otherwise. This is not to undermine the harm that 
may be suffered as a result of discrimination (there is no doubt that 
such harm may be real and significant), but to emphasise the far 
more severe harm of murder and sacrifice, and their utter 
incompatibility with Australia’s system of representative 
democracy. As Evans and Ujvari admit, the distinction or 
‘asymmetry’ is relative, not absolute. Fundamentally, harm imposed 
by discrimination is generally not as great in gravity as the harm 
imposed by murder and sacrifice, which means there is a distinction 
between the types of harm. This implies that there may also be 
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scope for distinctions relating to how the exemptions operate. 
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, religious groups and individuals 
suffer a ‘discrimination’ or ‘inequality’ of a kind when they are 
subject to anti-discrimination provisions in a way that injures their 
religious convictions.117 
 
This point is related to the second issue identified by Evans and 
Ujvari. It does not necessarily follow that religious exemptions to 
anti-discrimination laws imply that equality is a goal of limited 
value. Rather, what it may imply is that the exemptions are 
necessary in order to preserve equality.118 Anti-discrimination 
provisions fall disproportionately on organisations or individuals 
with religious convictions that conflict with the provisions, and 
specific exemptions are required to address this specific situation 
where there is an unequal or disproportionate application of law.119  
 
The need to foster a free and equal society consonant with 
prioritising democracy entails that freedom and equality must be 
extended to religious entities as well as members of the LGBTI 
community affected by unlawful discrimination, particularly given 
the specific Constitutional protection of free exercise. However, this 
freedom and protection must be compatible with democracy. 
Religions involving murder and sacrifice are not compatible with 
democracy and therefore do not attract the exemptions or protection 
by the free exercise clause. Limited discrimination based on sexual 
orientation may be compatible with democracy and therefore may 
attract the exemptions, but as discussed in the final part, this article 
proposes a proportionality test so that there is principled reasoning 
for whether the free exercise clause is applicable and whether an 
exemption is appropriate. 
 
Thus, to simply imply that religious exercise will be invalid where it 
conflicts with the general law is facile and incongruent. For 
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example, Evans and Ujvari claim that ‘religious institutions are 
supposed to adhere to the general law’.120 Such a statement is either 
without reference to the free exercise clause (which seems possible 
since the clause is not mentioned in their article), or the phrase 
‘general law’ cannot mean all Commonwealth law in existence. 
Invoking the clause to invalidate Commonwealth law prohibiting 
free exercise assumes the existence of a general law which 
contravenes the free exercise clause. An interpretation which claims 
that religious freedom must always bow to Commonwealth law 
would render the free exercise clause redundant by making it 
impossible to breach.121 A more textually and contextually 
appropriate interpretation is to engage in Gaudron J’s type of 
proportionality test, where the question of whether a law unduly 
infringes the protection is left to the Court to determine.122 
 
Given the reason for expanding the scope of the free exercise clause 
involves consistent application of the principles undergirding the 
implied freedom of political communication, it follows that use of a 
proportionality test ought to consider the High Court’s discussions 
of the applicability, utility and procedures for proportionality under 
the implied freedom. In Lange v Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation,123 the High Court first articulated the precise test for 
determining whether a law breaches the implied freedom: 
First, does the law effectively burden freedom of 
communication about government or political matters either in 
its terms, operation or effect? Second, if the law effectively 
burdens that freedom, is the law reasonably appropriate and 
adapted to serve a legitimate end the fulfillment of which is 
compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally 
prescribed system of representative and responsible 
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122  Ibid 131 (Latham CJ). 
123  (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
  
 
government… if the first question is answered ‘yes’ and the 
second is answered ‘no’, the law is invalid.124 
 
In Coleman v Power125 a majority of the High Court recast the 
second limb of this test (the compatibility and proportionality 
aspects) to state that the question is whether the impugned law is 
‘reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a 
manner which is compatible with the maintenance of the 
constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible 
government…’ In McCloy v New South Wales, the majority of the 
High Court (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) observed that the 
test from Lange remained authoritative, but the way the 
proportionality aspect had been phrased and executed was vague 
and based on holistic ‘impressions’, subject to ‘value judgments’, 
and lacked ‘generally applicable’, ‘objective criteria’.126 However, 
proportionality testing retained ‘evident utility as a tool for 
determining the reasonableness of legislation which restricts the 
freedom and for resolving conflicts between the freedom and the 
attainment of legislative purpose’.127 
 
Therefore, the High Court articulated three specific criteria to give 
substance and objectivity to the proportionality analysis – the law 
must be suitable, necessary and adequate in its balance; all three 
criteria must be satisfied. The law is suitable if it has a rational 
connection to the purpose of the provision; the law is necessary if 
there is no obvious and compelling alternative, reasonably 
practicable means of achieving the same purpose with a less 
restrictive effect on the freedom; and the law is adequate in its 
balance if a value judgment consistent with the judicial function 
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describes the importance of the purpose served by the restrictive 
measure as greater than the extent of the restriction it imposes on the 
freedom.128 Without entering into substantive debate, this article 
accepts the general utility of proportionality analysis for the free 
exercise clause, and agrees with the High Court that the criteria 
assists with providing more objective criteria for evaluation.129 What 
remains, then, is to articulate a possible version of such a test within 
the expanded view of the free exercise clause. 
 
 
VII PREFERENCE OVER BALANCE: THE FUTURE OF RELIGEOUS 
FREEDOMS AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION 
 
This article has suggested that in some circumstances it may be 
appropriate to privilege religious freedom over anti-discrimination, 
particularly given the explicit constitutional protection for religious 
freedom and democratic principles such as the importance of 
freedom, specifically religious freedom. However, there should be 
clear and specific legal principles governing when this can occur, 
including very explicit limits to the scope of application in order to 
minimise the potential for harm suffered by the LGBTI community 
resulting from unlawful discrimination. 
 
In particular, the article has adopted, expanded and developed 
Gaudron J’s textual and contextual arguments in Kruger that the 
current approach to the free exercise clause is too narrow, and ought 
to be broadened. It argued that this broad approach is more 
consistent with the priority for democracy reasoning which is the 
rationale for the High Court’s implied freedom of political 
communication in Nationwide News and Australian Capital 
Television. The broader approach should involve the consideration 
of a law’s effect in restricting free exercise of religion, not just its 
purpose, and the inclusion of individuals as well as organisations.  
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For example, drawing on Gaudron J’s test and the implied freedom 
of political communication test, the proportionality test for 
determining whether a law breaches the free exercise clause could 
be something like this:  A law will be a law for prohibiting the free 
exercise of religion if it restricts the free religious exercise of 
individuals or organisations in either its purpose or its effect, and if 
it does so restrict, the interference with free exercise is not 
reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a 
manner which is compatible with the maintenance of the 
constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible 
government. That is, the law will not prohibit the free exercise of 
religion if it is suitable, necessary and adequate, even if it does 
restrict free exercise. 
 
Without arguing the point here, according to this test (and even the 
narrower view of free exercise), at the very least religious 
organisations can discriminate such that any reduction of the current 
exemptions could breach the free exercise clause. However, Evans 
and Ujvari contend that even the present exemptions go too far, 
acknowledging that religious schools ‘play an important role’ and 
are ‘deserving of some protection of their distinctive worldview’, 
but stating that such protection is ‘consistent with the idea that that 
they should be subject to more aspects of discrimination law than is 
currently the case in Australia’.130 In particular, they criticise 
permitting discrimination to avoid ‘injuring religious 
susceptibilities’ on the basis that the phrase is ‘rather vague’, 
‘provides little guidance’, and that ‘religious freedom does not 
normally protect religious sensibilities’.131 
 
It does seem fair to say that the terms ‘sensibility’ and 
‘susceptibility’ are ambigious as applied to religion. For this reason, 
religious ‘convictions’ or ‘beliefs’ may be more clear terms, at least 
insofar as religious beliefs of organisations or individuals can be 
compared with established religious doctrine to see if these 
convictions are injured (that is, if free exercise is restricted). That 
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will be a question of fact in any given situation. Nevertheless, if we 
assume the claim of Evans and Ujvari that religious freedom does 
not protect religious sensibilities also applies to the protection of 
religious convictions, such a claim represents a comprehensive 
failure to take into account the operation of the free exercise clause. 
Even the narrowest view of free exercise involves the protection of 
religious convictions or beliefs, and even actions consequent on 
those beliefs.132 It also involves a constitutional preference for 
freedom of religion over anti-discrimination.133  
 
It follows from the constitutional preference for the free exercise of 
religion over anti-discrimination that the current anti-discrimination 
exemptions for religious organisations are justified, so that the 
organisations are free to exercise their religion in accordance with 
their religious doctrine. The expanded view of free exercise, taking 
into account effect as well as purpose, and applying to individuals as 
well as organisations, arguably justifies additional exemptions for 
individuals affected in their religious practice by anti-discrimination 
provisions. The possible test outlined above is a method of 
undertaking a principled evaluation on a case-by-case basis. 
 
This version of the test, though very preliminary, is compatible with 
the majority test from Kruger and antecedent cases which emphasise 
the purpose of the law and its consistency with the maintenance of 
an ordered society, as it incorporates these aspects. However, in 
accordance with priority for democracy principles, it is also broader 
to allow for the consideration of effect so that the Commonwealth 
cannot seek to do indirectly what they cannot do directly. 
Furthermore, consideration of the effect on individuals as well as 
organisations promotes democracy by harmonising the 
constitutionally required preference for religious liberty suggested 
by s 116 with the constitutionally prescribed system of 
representative government undergirding the implied freedom of 
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communication, which emphasises individual freedom to participate 
in the democratic process and society in general. 
 
Berg refers to a specific United States example where a wedding 
photographer was forced to pay $6600 in legal fees after declining, 
on religious grounds, to photograph a same-sex commitment 
ceremony.134 This example can serve as a test case for the expanded 
view of free exercise. If such a situation occurred in Australia in 
relation to a same-sex marriage ceremony, the photographer could 
not appeal to an exemption under Commonwealth anti-
discrimination legislation. The exemptions only exist for religious 
institutions or organisations, not individuals or small businesses. 
Furthermore, the photographer could not appeal to the current view 
of free exercise as expressed by the majority in Kruger, because the 
anti-discrimination legislation is not for the specific purpose of 
restricting religious exercise. The legislation would therefore apply, 
and the wedding photographer would either be compelled to 
photograph the wedding against their religious convictions or be 
forced to suffer some legal penalty. 
 
If the expanded view of free exercise applies, the first part of the test 
(the burden aspect, to follow the language of the implied freedom of 
political communication) would be satisfied. The anti-discrimination 
legislation restricts religious exercise in its effect by preventing the 
wedding photographer from conducting their business in accordance 
with their religious beliefs. The second part of the test is the 
compatibility aspect, which asks whether the purpose of the law and 
the means used to achieve that purpose are compatible with the 
constitutionally prescribed system of the representative system of 
government in the sense that they do not impinge upon the 
functioning of that system.135 The purpose of the anti-discrimination 
legislation is to promote equality in society, and the means used to 
achieve that purpose is to prohibit discriminatory conduct.  
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The purpose is clearly legitimate, but prohibiting discriminatory 
conduct as the means to achieve that purpose may impinge upon the 
functioning of representative government by preventing the wedding 
photographer from fully participating as a citizen in society in a way 
consistent with their religious convictions. So it is necessary to 
consider the third part of the test, which is the proportionality 
analysis or whether the anti-discrimination law is suitable, necessary 
and adequate. The law is plainly suitable as it has a rational 
connection to its purpose, which is to promote equality by 
prohibiting unlawful discrimination. The law may not be adequate 
in the sense that though the importance of promoting equality 
through preventing discrimination is obviously considerable, the 
extent of the burden on religious freedom is significant because of 
the injury to religious conviction or the imposition of a legal penalty 
for non-compliance. The point is arguable and is a question of fact. 
 
Most importantly, the law is probably not necessary, in the sense 
that there is an obvious and compelling alternative, reasonably 
practicable means of achieving the same purpose with a less 
restrictive effect on the freedom. This would simply be to provide 
an exemption of the type described earlier: a provision which states 
that individuals who refuse to offer goods or services in a situation 
where to do so would conflict with the doctrine and practice of their 
religion, or who would have their religious convictions offended 
were they compelled to offer the good or service in that situation, 
are not subject to the anti-discrimination provisions unless the 
refusal directly results in ‘concrete hardship’ for those who seek the 
service (that is, if there is no equivalent service reasonably 
available).136  
 
This achieves the purpose of promoting equality by acknowledging 
the disproportionate effect anti-discrimination legislation has on 
those with religious objections, and provides a means by which such 
individuals and businesses can continue meaningfully participating 
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in society without restricting their free exercise.137 It also achieves 
the purpose of equality for those discriminated against by imposing 
a limit on the exemption where there is no other equivalent service 
reasonably available so that there is no substantive damage or 
hardship suffered as a result. 
 
It seems the experience of concrete hardship would be a relatively 
rare case. Certainly, in the situation Berg alludes to, another 
wedding photographer was found through a friend and there was no 
evidence presented of any costs incurred for finding another 
wedding photographer.138 However, the limit is present and would 
operate where there is no other wedding photographer reasonably 
available. Price, skill and geographical factors could be considered 
in that evaluation. Furthermore, if a service provider was ‘holding 
out’ on someone seeking the service, and deliberately causing 
hardship and anxiety rather than genuinely avoiding compromise on 
a religious conviction, the exemption would not apply. 
 
Including relevant and appropriate exemptions for discrimination by 
religious individuals as well as organisations facilitates religious 
speech and conduct which contributes towards democracy. The test 
also imposes limits where religious speech and conduct is not 
reasonably appropriate and not compatible with the fostering of 
democracy; unreasonable and/or malicious conduct, insults, 
incitement, violence, oppression and the like would not be allowed, 
but debate and discussion and disagreement over what marriage is, 
including religious perspectives which could affect voting and the 
ability to reasonably refuse services which injure religious 
convictions, would be allowed. This assists in maintaining a 
pluralist democracy without conflicting with the constitutional 
preference for religious liberty. Ultimately, whatever one thinks of 
these proposals, what is certain is that the conversation needs to 
occur. The intrinsic tension between religious freedom and anti-
discrimination will only increase; this much is suggested by the 
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recent proliferation of relevant cases. To address such an important 
emerging issue, the scope of the free exercise clause should be 
clearly and appropriately articulated for the benefit of judges, 
legislators, and the public which comprise the Australian 
democracy. 
